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Do Unto Others: On the Importance of Reciprocity in Public Administration 
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Abstract 
 
There is an extensive literature across the humanities and social sciences on reciprocity as a 
fundamental driver of human behaviour, and yet attempts to bring the main arguments from the 
diverse literatures together in a single interdisciplinary space remain scarce. This article aims to 
collate many of the main arguments from these literatures with the intention of speculating how 
reciprocity might be used to inform institutional structures, management practices and public 
policy. This is significant, because the recent literature on public sector policy design tends to attach 
import to entirely self-regarding and/or altruistic motivations as fundamental drivers of human 
action, but, with some notable exceptions, says little directly on the role that reciprocity might have 
to play in motivating performance improvements. The lack of attention paid to reciprocity in the 
literature on human motivation and public policy design is problematic if one concludes that 
reciprocating behaviours are a major determinant of group cooperation and success.  
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Introduction 
 
Deliberations on the importance of reciprocity as an ethical imperative are as old as the history of 
recorded thought and are central to many of the world’s major religions. In Luke 6.31 of the New 
Testament, for instance, Jesus exhorts us to do unto others as we would have them do unto us and 
negative reciprocity, in the form of punishing harmful acts is embedded in the Old Testament, the 
Torah and the Qur’an. In his classic book, The Gift, the social anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, noted 
that the Latin do ut des and the Sanskrit dadami se, dehi me, which both can be translated to ‘I give 
in order that you may give’, are found in Western and Eastern religious texts, and in the quasi-
religious Analects of Confucius we are told that what we do not wish for ourselves we should not 
wish for others. The so-called golden rule – treat others how you wish to be treated – is everywhere.  
 
Some may contend that the golden rule is too idealistic to be taken seriously in practice, but the 
notion that underlies the rule – i.e. reciprocity, which the evolutionary biologist, Robert Trivers 
(1971), claimed is observed in all known cultures – is not only a normative proposition. Most 
people, much of the time, unconsciously and consciously reciprocate. Reciprocal acts are often 
attitudinal; simple acts of cooperation with immediate rewards that are common in the animal 
kingdom. Attitudinal reciprocity is akin to direct reciprocity – i.e. if you help me, I will help you, 
and if you stop helping me, I will stop helping you, or in other words, tit for tat. Tit for tat was 
modelled famously as the optimum strategy of human cooperation by Axelrod (1984), although 
others have argued that this is a poor strategy when the information about the payoffs or behaviour 
of one’s partner is less than perfect, or when the cooperating group is large (Henrich and Henrich, 
2007). Nonetheless, attitudinal reciprocity appears to have arisen earlier in the evolutionary chain 
than a more deliberative form of reciprocity, and may have served as the kernel for cooperation.  
 
Some animals, most notably humans, also store favours in their long term memories and repay kind 
actions at some future date, in which trust, gratitude, guilt and felt obligations all play a role. This 
reflective cooperative behaviour is usually referred to as reciprocal altruism, and involves a 
willingness to incur a cost in the expectation that it will be repaid in kind. It is assumed throughout 
this article that an unkind response to an unkind action is an act of negative reciprocity, or what 
Trivers (1971) called moralistic aggression. Gintis et al. (2005) define as a strong reciprocator any 
individual who is both a conditional co-operator in the positive sense and an altruistic punisher – i.e. 
a person willing to punish others at a personal cost to themselves. Although incurring an immediate 
cost, the possibility that an altruistic punisher expects their actions to reap for themselves longer 
term gains cannot be discounted (Trivers, 1971), and, even in the short term, a willingness to punish 
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may enhance a person’s reputation. The importance of reputation to reciprocity is an issue to which 
we will later return. If the number of altruistic punishers in a population is too small, selfish actions 
become more profitable and may drive out reciprocal altruism. Gintis et al. (2005) argue that a high 
level of cooperation in groups can only be attained when there is a sufficient proportion of strong 
reciprocators – i.e. people who are both reciprocal altruists and altruistic punishers – in the 
population, although work by Yamagishi (1986) lends itself to the intriguing possibility that 
different people adopt different roles in attempting to sustain cooperative endeavours, where it was 
observed that less trusting individuals are less likely to be reciprocal altruists than their more 
trusting counterparts, but are more likely to be altruistic punishers.  
 
In the literature on how to motivate public sector performance improvements, direct discussion of 
reciprocity has been strangely lacking. Rather, the debate, particularly over the last twenty years, 
has tended to focus on whether public sector workers are pure altruists or entirely self-regarding 
utility maximisers. Le Grand (1997), for instance, argued that the post-war consensus that those 
who work within the British welfare state are public spirited altruists ought no longer to hold, to be 
replaced by the assumption that they are also often motivated by their own avaricious tendencies. It 
is difficult to contend that there is not an important role for motivational considerations in the 
design of public sector institutions (or indeed, all institutions), but when humans are taken as the 
relevant actors then assuming entirely altruistic or self-regarding behaviours reduces us to caricature 
rather than reality, and in terms of institutional design may lead us from one damaging 
organisational structure to another.  
 
There is a rich multidisciplinary literature on the concept of reciprocity, some of which I will 
attempt to summarise in this article, first because a multidisciplinary summary has only 
occasionally been attempted, and second because this will emphasise its importance as a basic 
human, and sometimes non-human, motivation. Some of the literature in the area of motivational 
theory and policy governance will then be reviewed, if only to highlight the contention that 
reciprocity has not been given the explicit consideration it merits. The article will also include a 
consideration of how reciprocity might inform public policy design.  
 
 
Reciprocity and human motivation 
 
It is plausible that the importance of reciprocity to religious doctrine arose from it being 
fundamental to human nature. That is, the normative may have been driven by the descriptive, a 
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proposition supported by Charles Darwin (1879). Religions may therefore have been designed, in 
part, to reinforce the importance of a behavioural motivation that most humans intrinsically accept 
and which strengthens the group collective. In making the case that reciprocity is intrinsic to human 
nature, it may be worth considering this phenomenon in relation to some of our closest relatives.  
 
In primatology research, the evidence on reciprocity appears to be mixed, depending partly on the 
species studied but also on the interpretation given to an action by the researcher. Silk (2005) notes 
that mutual grooming is common among primates, but the extent to which it is more than attitudinal 
reciprocity is not known definitively. Nonetheless, Silk maintains that it may be done to afford 
protection, to build coalitions, to receive food and access to newborns over which many female 
monkeys take a strong interest. De Waal (2010) is adamant that apes and monkeys display 
behaviour that suggests something stronger than attitudinal reciprocity. He reports an experiment in 
which two capuchin monkeys are separated by wire mesh. If both monkeys are required to pull on a 
counterweighted tray in order for only one of the two monkeys to reach a cup of apple slices, the 
monkey in receipt of the apple will push more of it through the wire mesh to the assistant capuchin 
than when he secures the apple entirely by his own efforts. If the assistant is not rewarded as such, 
he is less likely to help out if the task is repeated, which again hints at an attitude that is memory-
based.   
 
De Waal (2010) further notes that in wild chimpanzees a male’s chance of receiving a share of 
captured prey appears to depend on his role in the hunt rather than his dominance within the group, 
perhaps to serve to incentivise full cooperation in hunting expeditions. De Waal goes on to note 
observations of memory-based reciprocity in captive chimpanzees, amongst whom the chances of 
other chimps receiving a share of food that has been handed to any one particular chimp will 
depend on whether the other chimps have administered a favour, such as grooming, to the food-
laden chimp within the previous half an hour to two hours. Interestingly, this tendency is lessened 
within close kin, where prior favours may be expected, weakening a kin-based explanation for the 
observed reciprocity.  
 
Tomasello (2009) is less convinced than de Waal that ape behaviour is demonstrably reciprocal and 
takes the view that they are invariably selfish. Although a sceptic of memory-based reciprocity 
among other primates, arguing that what seem to be organised hunts by chimps are really just 
chimps acting individually according to what seems the best action in the moment (Tomasello et al., 
2005), Tomasello (2009) concurs that humans possess the mental apparatus that enables reciprocity. 
He believes that humans developed shared intentions first among two or three people when 
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foraging, then eventually scaled up these actions in hunter gatherer societies, where the promise of 
capturing large game on any single day was far from secure, and in response to threats from others. 
Victory went to the most cohesive groups, and shared intentionality predated language. According 
to Tomasello, from a very young age, children start to care about their reputations. That is, they 
want to give the impression that they are a good member of the group to show that they are worthy 
of cooperation. As mooted earlier, a concern for reputation and acts of reciprocity go hand in hand 
in that information about reputation is probably a key factor in initiating and sustaining cooperation 
between non-kin. Elinor Ostrom (1998) wrote that people have an incentive to acquire a good 
reputation for keeping promises and performing acts that appear immediately selfless because this 
makes them appear trustworthy, and trustworthy people will engage with other trustworthy people 
in mutually beneficial social exchanges. Similarly, Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), borrowing 
from Sugden (1986), refer to the importance of good standing, and note that this is particularly 
relevant for initiating and sustaining indirect reciprocity, where the members of a group are willing 
contribute to the collective good outside of more direct one-to-one dyadic exchanges (i.e. Tom is 
willing to undertake an act that benefits Harry outside of any direct reciprocal relationship that they 
may have, so long as Harry is in good standing). Acts of indirect reciprocity are important in large, 
complex institutions. A partial explanation for the tendency for people to comply with social norms 
– including the norm of reciprocity – is that this strengthens a person’s reputation, which is key 
when reciprocity is indirect, or at most, sporadic rather than daily.  
 
There is an extensive anthropological literature on reciprocity and this discipline offers further 
insight on the origin of the concept as a social norm. Mauss (1954), mentioned earlier, wrote that 
although gift giving in primitive cultures often appears voluntary, gifts are not pure acts of altruism. 
Rather, they are given and repaid under obligation and therefore foster reciprocity. According to 
Mauss, gifts based on obligation arose out of total prestation, in which clans, and individuals and 
groups within clans, exchange everything. There is an urge in some groups to return a gift of at least 
equal value so as to not allow the other giver a feeling of superiority or dominance. A person cannot 
easily refuse a gift, because to do so means losing dignity due to showing a fear of having to repay.  
 
Gift giving in primitive societies was clearly underpinned by something more than attitudinal 
reciprocity. It was deliberative and relied on memory and, according to Mauss, barter arose from 
this system. Heath (1976, p.55) wrote that Mauss saw the gift exchange as intermediate between 
total prestation and the modern economic transaction. Mauss also noted that the Greeks and 
Romans drew the distinction between the earlier ritual nature of gifts, and exchange driven by the 
law and economic interest. They thus developed beyond what may have been perceived as an 
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antiquated gift society, which was encumbered by personal considerations and may have been 
incompatible with the development of the market, trade and productivity. Mauss argued that as 
societies became larger and more atomised, and as people moved from clans to communities, they 
became more egoistic. 
 
Whether or not Mauss was right, many hold the view that the human tendency to reciprocate, both 
positively and negatively, remains central to the proper functioning of more contemporary social 
and economic systems, implying that it is difficult for us to escape entirely from this fundamental 
aspect of human motivation – even if we should want to – irrespective of the institutional structure 
of society. Indeed, the importance of reciprocity implicitly appears often in the writings of Adam 
Smith, widely considered to be the father of much of modern economic theory and almost as widely 
used in support of arguments for selfish motivations. Smith (1759, p.95) defined what are now 
known as positive and negative reciprocity when he wrote that “Actions of a beneficent tendency, 
which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require reward; because such alone are the 
approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator. Actions of a 
hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment; 
because such alone are the approved objects of resentment, or excite the sympathetic resentment of 
the spectator.”  
 
Smith was particularly convinced that the tendency towards negative reciprocity was a crucial 
feature of the natural human motivation to cooperate. He wrote (p.104-105), for instance, that 
“Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill desert, those terrors of merited 
punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safeguards of the association of mankind.” 
He appeared to take the view that feelings of love and gratitude are optimal in binding the members 
of society together. He maintained (p.103-104), for instance, that “All the members of human 
society stand in need of each others assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where 
the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship, and 
esteem, the society flourishes and is happy.” However, he took the view that not all relations – and 
perhaps most economic transactions – were driven by love and affection: that “Society may subsist 
among different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual 
love or affection; and though no man in it should owe any obligation, or be bound in gratitude to 
any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices, according to an agreed 
valuation” (p.104). His imagination of the market exchange between the butcher, the baker and the 
brewer in The Wealth of Nations (Smith, 1776) – local artisans producing relatively simple, easily 
understood goods with limited opportunities to exploit informational asymmetries and with a bond 
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of trust – was driven as such. Some have interpreted The Wealth of Nations as an argument in 
favour of self-love, mutual indifference and moral neutrality between trading partners in a market 
exchange, at least in perfect markets where trading partners are equally free to act on their own 
interests (Bruni and Sugden, 2008), circumstances that are perhaps better characterised by beer and 
bread than health and education. One could contend that Smith overlooked to some extent the trade 
in complex goods, or in areas riven by informational asymmetries, and that if he had not then he 
may have included explicitly in his writings on market exchange the reciprocity arguments that are 
so central to social relationships in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Alternatively, it is at least 
plausible that The Wealth of Nations has been widely misinterpreted, and that Smith, who believed 
reciprocity to be such a fundamental part of human social relationships, never meant for people to 
believe that he thought that this motivating force is absent from the market exchange. However, 
even if he did see social and market relationships as necessarily fundamentally different from each 
other, the important point to note here is that he considered reciprocity to be a basic human 
motivation.  
 
Others draw a distinction between economic and social policy. Titmuss (1970), for instance, claims 
that social policy differs from economic policy in that social policy centres more on institutions that 
create integration and discourage alienation. Blau (1964) maintains that the difference between a 
social exchange and an economic exchange is that in a social exchange, although a return is 
expected, it is usually a future obligation that is not precisely specified, and the nature of the 
exchange should not be bargained but should be left to the discretion of the giver, although Heath 
(1976) counters by contending that a social exchange is much more formalised than Blau suggests – 
for example, the division of labour in the family is often proscribed rather than left to discretion – 
and thus the distinction between economic and social exchange may be on a continuum rather than 
a dichotomy. Moreover, it is worth noting that Bruni and Sugden (2008; 2013) see the possibility of 
a reciprocal orientation in market transactions that is compatible with market efficiency, and draw 
on Smith’s contemporary, the economist Antonio Genovesi (1765-67), to support their argument. 
According to Bruni and Sugden (2008), Genovesi did not believe that there is a difference between 
market relationships and those governed by civil society. He maintained that markets are based on 
the human tendency towards mutual assistance, that reciprocity is central to economic exchange, 
and that each party to a market exchange needs to understand and respect what the other party 
wants.  
 
Modern behavioural economists have also contributed to the study of reciprocity in human 
motivation, perhaps most robustly with use of the ultimatum game, in which respondents are paired, 
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with each pair comprised of a donor and a recipient. Donors are given a money amount and are 
asked to allocate a share of that amount to their recipient (the recipient is generally anonymous to 
the donor). If the recipient accepts the share, then both donor and recipient receive these respective 
allocations, but if the recipient declines then both parties receive nothing. According to standard 
economic theory, the donor should offer a very small share because he ought to want to retain as 
much of the money as possible and, for the recipient, anything ought to be considered better than 
nothing. However, it is not untypical for mean offers to exceed 40%, with the modal offer generally 
at 50%, and offers of less than 30% frequently rejected by recipients (Gintis et al., 2005; Kahneman 
et al., 1986).  
 
In some primitive cultures it has been observed that offers of more than 50% of the donor’s 
holdings are rejected not infrequently, indicating again that accepting a large gift in certain contexts 
renders a person subordinate, and that at least some people resist this circumstance (Gintis et al., 
2005). This implies that donors in these contexts would be wise to refrain from being too generous. 
Indeed, lower than typical offers have been observed in other primitive groups, with donors among 
Machiguenga horticulturists offering on average 26% of the total pot, with a modal offer of 15% 
(Henrich, 2000), although Henrich also cites many studies where responses to the ultimatum game 
are similar across cultures. Some may contend that recipients are less likely to reject small 
proportions when the stakes are substantial, but research in developing country contexts has 
demonstrated that strong reciprocity continues to be observed when the initial money allocation is 
as high as three months income (Cameron, 1999). However, it is noteworthy that a substantial 
proportion of ultimatum game respondents – generally about a quarter – tend to behave in an 
entirely self-regarding manner. This indicates again that there is a mix of motivations behind human 
behaviour, as reflected in the need theory of motivation, where it is postulated that the human need 
for affiliation drives cooperative and social desires, with the needs for achievement and power 
perhaps being more closely associated with selfish egoism (McClelland, 1961). Nonetheless, the 
ultimatum game supports the conjecture that humans are often motivated by strong reciprocity. 
According to Gintis et al. (2005), this is further backed up by qualitative evidence showing that, 
when asked why they offer more than the lowest amount, donors commonly say that they are afraid 
that respondents will consider low offers unfair and reject them, and when recipients reject offers, 
they frequently state that they want to punish unfair behaviour. 
 
In the so-called dictator game, donors simply allocate a share of their endowment to the recipients 
and both parties leave with those allocations. The threat of negative reciprocity is therefore absent, 
and yet even here donors offer positive amounts that typically range from 20-60% of the total 
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(Forsythe et al., 1994). Although the share offered is normally somewhat lower than that observed 
in the ultimatum game, the fact that donor offerings remain substantial may suggest that a hard-
wired concern about the threat of negative reciprocity plays an important role. It may also indicate 
that the tendency towards positive reciprocity is not merely an instrumental behaviour intended to 
secure personal gain, but is often consequent on an intrinsic concern for some concept of fairness. 
Although one might conclude that these donors are more concerned with distributional fairness in 
final outcomes than reciprocal altruism, Fong et al. (2005) report an experiment that paired several 
dictator donors with real life welfare recipients and found that significantly more money was 
allocated to recipients who expressed strong work preferences than those who expressed weak work 
preferences, indicating that the donors preferred giving to those who were more willing to offer 
something back.  
 
Behavioural economists have reported further findings that lend support to the notion of reciprocity 
being a strong motivator of human behaviour (for further examples, see Ostrom, 1998). For 
instance, Fehr et al. (1997) conducted an experiment where respondents were asked to assume that 
they were employers or employees. The neoclassical economic assumption that inspired the 
experiment is that those placing themselves in the position of employees would be entirely self-
regarding, and will therefore choose a zero-cost effort level in a hypothetical contract irrespective of 
the wage offered to them, an assumption that had been challenged earlier by Akerlof (1982), who 
speculated that a wage higher than the minimum necessary would often be perceived by employees 
as a gift, who would consequently work harder than self-interest dictates. In the Fehr et al. 
experiment, neoclassical economic postulates infer that those assuming the employer position 
would anticipate that employees would choose a zero-cost effort level and would thus offer no more 
than the minimum wage. However, Fehr et al. found that the higher the wage offered by employers, 
the higher the effort level to which employees committed, which resonates with the equity theory of 
human motivation, where it is advanced that equilibrium between the parties engaged in a 
transaction is achieved when all parties believe that what they bring to and take from that 
transaction is fair, and that those who act unfairly are punished (Adams, 1963). Fehr et al. attributed 
their results to employer recognition that employees would be predisposed towards strong 
reciprocity, and thus made quite generous wage offers. Therefore, the anticipation of strong 
reciprocity probably made both the employers and the employees better off than they otherwise 
would have been, although it ought to be noted that a not insubstantial proportion of employees did 
indeed act in an entirely self-regarding way.    
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Social psychologists, whose work informs and is informed by behavioural economics, have also 
written extensively on reciprocity. Haidt (2012), for instance, maintains that most evolutionary 
theorists still believe that anything that looks superficially like group-related adaptation – i.e. that 
reciprocity and cooperation within a group have evolved to help that group outcompete other groups 
(also known as group selection theory) – is really adaptation to help individuals outcompete 
neighbours within the same group, which resembles Tomasello’s scepticism with respect to chimps 
cooperating in hunting expeditions, mentioned earlier. According to Haidt, however, intense 
intergroup competition, with intragroup gratitude and vengeance, will continually strengthen 
loyalty, sanctity and reciprocity in successive generations. Henrich and Henrich (2007) go as far as 
to say that these cultural adaptations can influence biological predispositions over relatively short 
periods of time; for example the mutation towards milk sugar tolerance among human adults 
following the domestication of cows 6,000 years ago. Human biology can perhaps modify in ways 
that are beneficial to the survival of the organism following a change in cultural practices, and 
Henrich and Henrich imply that this has happened with the development of cooperation.      
 
Although most evolutionary theorists might still reject group-related adaptation, there are a 
seemingly increasing number of exceptions. For instance, in summarising sociobiology, David 
Sloan Wilson and E. O. Wilson (2007) paraphrase Rabbi Hillel’s pronouncement that “What is 
hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour; that is the whole of the Tora, while the rest is 
commentary”, by writing that “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat 
selfish groups. Everything else is commentary” (by altruism, they appear to be referring to 
reciprocal altruism rather than pure altruism). Gintis et al. (2005, p.30) wrote that “prosocial norms 
evolve not because they have superior fitness within groups, but because groups with prosocial 
norms outcompete groups that are deficient in this respect.”, and Silk (2005) commented that while 
a person individually may benefit from giving less than he receives, too much self-interest is bad for 
the evolutionary success of the group. Group selection theory has arguably even been observed in 
action among Japanese macaques, where females seem to try to maximise selfishly their own rank 
among their kin on the one hand, and yet work towards cooperating with their kin to improve their 
group’s rank relative to non-kin groups on the other (Chapais, 1995). Group selection theory thus 
suggests a mix of motives, not only at the interpersonal level but also at the intrapersonal level. 
Many people are often reciprocators, but not all of the time. For instance, as earlier noted, even in 
the ultimatum game a substantial number of people tend to behave in an entirely selfish manner, 
and negative reciprocity can deter other otherwise selfish actors from pursuing their favoured 
actions. On the basis of evidence from controlled experiments, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) believe 
that 40-50% of people are strong reciprocators, implying that 50-60% of people are not, although 
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the percentage of strong reciprocators may well be much higher if the question is focused on who is 
a strong reciprocator some, but not all, of the time. Smith and Bird (2005) note that people 
occasionally undertake generous acts, such as those associated with charity and self-sacrifice, that 
are not contingent on reciprocity, and thus pure altruism as well as selfishness is sometimes evident, 
although one may contend that those acts are done to enhance reputation, and to therefore serve to 
indicate that the actor is a good person with whom to cooperate. Moreover, extreme self-sacrifice 
often tends to be associated with the belief of being rewarded in the afterlife. To varying degrees, it 
is likely that most people are selfish, altruistic and – not or – reciprocal, but for the success of a 
group, our cooperative and reciprocal tendencies – our sense of fairness in exchange relationships – 
seem key.      
 
Notwithstanding the debate on exactly how reciprocal people generally are, the arguments put forth 
by many of the great thinkers across a range of disciplines imply that the tendencies to reward the 
kind and punish the unkind are often powerful motivators of behaviour. Moreover, this motivational 
force is not merely attitudinal, but is often deliberative. It is certainly a descriptive phenomenon, 
and to the extent that it is central to fostering cooperation, then, assuming that cooperation is 
necessarily good – admittedly a strong statement when we consider the collective bad of which man 
is capable – it is a normative requirement too. Acknowledgement that reciprocity has possible 
negative consequences should not be diminished. For instance, Ostrom (1998) noted that if 
punishment – i.e. negative reciprocity – leads to escalating retribution, then people may soon 
become demotivated and relationships can become hostile and irreconcilable, and that a tendency 
towards rewarding favours for favours can sometimes result in corruption. The sociologist, Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen (1990), went as far as to point out that German and Italian fascist parties granted 
an array of social rights that were conditional on required loyalty and morality, but our focus in this 
article is on the indubitable good that reciprocity can bring. It is therefore important to incorporate 
our understanding of this fundamental human motivation into deliberations on organisational 
structures and behaviours, management practices and the design of public policy, so that 
interventions are more likely to achieve the ends towards which they are intended.   
 
 
Human motivation and institutional structure 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argued convincingly that the ways in which different countries manage 
and finance their welfare sectors in contemporary capitalist societies is strongly dependent on the 
historical motivations for establishing those sectors to begin with. He identified three models in this 
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respect, with the first – the conservative tradition – seen, for example, in Germany, based around 
guilds and mutualities, which, according to Esping-Andersen, is close to the original reliance on the 
family being the source of support and care in times of need. The conservative model was often 
adopted to see off the threat of socialism. The liberal tradition, which the United States exemplifies, 
espoused freedom from existing conservative and authoritative influences, encouraged competition 
and promoted public support for groups that were perceived as, in some sense, deserving (e.g. the 
elderly and veterans of the armed forces). Finally, the socialist or social democratic tradition, 
followed in, for example, Sweden, aimed to unite the different social classes in the support of public 
services. Here, government enticed the growing middle classes with generous second tier 
universally inclusive earnings-related insurance schemes on top of a flat rate egalitarian one, which 
was done to maintain support for universalism and high taxes from the aspiring classes. Although 
Esping-Andersen did not acknowledge it explicitly, all three traditions, to a considerable degree, are 
informed by reciprocity.  
 
In the modern literature on how human motivations should shape institutional design, however, 
reciprocity attracts little attention, with the focus instead placed upon the tension between selfish 
egoism and pure altruism. For instance, Le Grand (1997; 2003), inspired by Hume’s (1777) 
probably misinterpreted view that every man ought to be supposed an avaricious knave (see 
Bowles, 2016), posits that a driving motivation of public sector professionals is pure self-interest. 
Le Grand argues that men must be governed in the knowledge that they are often knavish so as to 
steer their ambitions towards the public good. He maintains that democratic socialists, like Titmuss, 
adopted an altruistic view of human nature with which they heavily influenced the structure of the 
post-war British welfare state. Thus, Le Grand notes that British public sector services tended to be 
collectivist and without competitive incentives. Money was allocated to public sector professionals 
unconditionally, and they were let to get on with their jobs in the faith that they would altruistically 
deliver the best services that they could.    
 
Le Grand categorises altruistic acts as knightly, and although he believes that the tendency towards 
knightly motivations has been exaggerated, he recognises that knightly and knavish behaviours 
coexist. He argues, however, that since knavish behaviour is common then competitive forces ought 
to be used within the public sector. Unless public sectors workers are incentivised as such, Le 
Grand posits, they will become lazy; if they have to compete for purchasers or contracts, they will 
knavishly be concerned with their budgets and will consequently provide a better quality service. Le 
Grand is clearly alluding to avaricious tendencies in human nature. It is logical that those motivated 
by greed will attempt to exploit their situation for their own benefit whenever possible, and there is 
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plausibly much scope for suppliers to do so in a competitive market over complex public goods. 
One could argue that competition may undermine reciprocity since suppliers may now attempt to 
use underhand methods to maintain market share. For competitive markets to work in public sector 
services, we must hope that egoism does not crowd out any natural tendencies towards reciprocity. 
More fundamentally, we should question whether it is wise to risk weakening those tendencies.  
 
Bevan and Fasolo (2013) summarise what they posit as the four alternative models of governance 
that can be used to inform institutional structures, two of which they claim are altruism and 
choice/competition. The other two are: hierarchy and targets (see also Bevan and Hood, 2006), 
which involves strong performance management; and reputation, which centres on the public 
reporting of performance, including naming and shaming. While Bevan and Fasolo agree with Le 
Grand that an altruistic model is inadequately powered to produce performance improvements, they 
believe that the market mechanism is flawed for many public services, partly because public 
services tend to be complex and imperfectly marketable. They instead take the view that 
professionals respond to threats to their reputation, which they say is fundamental to human 
motivation, and cite evidence in support of their claim that the reputational strategy of public 
reporting has been the most effective form of public sector governance in the health and education 
domains in the UK and in some parts of the US. For example, at the turn of the 21st Century, a 
policy mechanism, known as the hospital star rating system, was introduced in the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England. Through this mechanism, hospitals were assessed annually on a number 
of indicators, including, most importantly, targets against waiting times, an aspect of performance 
with respect to which the NHS has traditionally attracted substantial criticism. Following 
assessment, hospitals were each awarded from zero to three stars, with more stars indicating better 
performance. For very poor performance, hospital management teams could be dismissed; for very 
good performance, managers could gain greater freedoms over the ways in which they organised 
their hospitals. Moreover, the number of stars that each hospital was awarded was publicised widely 
in the national and local press. That there was a threat of dismissal demonstrates that the star rating 
system relied on naming and shaming with clear potential consequences in order to motivate 
performance improvements. In terms of reducing waiting times, it worked: the NHS witnessed 
substantial reduced waiting times during the period that the star rating system was in operation 
(Besley et al., 2009). 
 
Bevan and Fasolo maintain that reputation “could work out of fear of having betrayed the public’s 
trust and provides an urgent reason for acting before the public reacts and ‘punishes’ this 
betrayal...shocks of this kind are an integral part of generating the high powered incentives 
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necessary for improvement” (Bevan and Fasolo, 2013, p.56). Putting aside for one moment the 
potentially damaging problem that public reporting may ultimately demotivate professionals if they 
do not agree with how their performance is being represented – for instance, poor relative 
performance may not be bad in an absolute sense, and outcomes may often in any case be beyond 
the control of the professional – Bevan and Fasolo do not acknowledge that a concern for reputation 
is intrinsically linked to the notion of reciprocity. The literature on reciprocity would suggest that a 
cautious implementation of something akin to the reputation model of governance, that threatens to 
punish genuinely indisputable bad absolute performance after all relevant stakeholders have been 
involved in defining ‘performance’ and that also possibly rewards examples of innovative good 
practice, is worthy of serious consideration.   
 
Others have contended that the governance debate has focused on the relative merits and demerits 
of markets, hierarchies and networks. The market model is that advocated by Le Grand. The 
hierarchical model involves the imposition of an authoritative supervisory structure, but, according 
to some, this can stifle innovation through the tendency towards routinisation and formulisation 
(Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). It has been noted that markets and hierarchies are the two opposing 
extreme types of governance, with networks sitting in between (Treib, Bähr and Falkner, 2007), 
which resonates if one associates markets with selfish egoism, hierarchies with paternalistic 
altruism, and networks with reciprocity. In networks, actors identify complementary interests and 
relationships are built based on trust, loyalty and reciprocity. Networks are based on horizontal 
patterns of interactions as opposed to power asymmetries, although contracts will be incomplete due 
to bounded rationality (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). Conflicts are resolved within networks on the 
basis of members’ reputational concerns (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998), and thus the network mode 
of governance appears to be the most preferable if one accepts that reciprocity is fundamental to 
human nature.  
 
Some have extended the governance debate beyond markets, hierarchies and networks. Bell et al. 
(2010), for instance, argue that a persuasion mode of governance can be added to this mix; by 
persuading people to change their behaviours, they maintain that government and non-government 
bodies influence but do not enforce, and that states can enhance their power by building 
relationships with non-state actors. Moreover, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) extoll the benefits of 
collaborative, inter-agency partnerships as a means of achieving policy goals, and these are 
emphasised by the authors as an alternative to the market, although they take care to state that the 
creation of a partnership board does not imply that relations between the relevant actors will be 
based on mutual benefit, trust and reciprocity, but that partnerships are associations with a variety 
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of forms of social organisation, including hierarchy, the market and networks. They contend that 
effective partnerships combine different modes of governance in an environment where power 
between the relevant actors can shift; in essence, they are arguing that partnerships are able to adapt 
to different circumstances.   
 
The governance literature on the whole does not appear to consider explicitly the notion of 
reciprocity as a basic human motivation, and does not offer many lessons on how reciprocity can be 
used to inform specific macro and micro policy design, and yet it could, and arguably should, be 
used to inform both. The literature on network governance structures does of course allude heavily 
to reciprocity, and yet is quite weak on emphasising how this phenomenon is intrinsic to human 
nature and is vague on policy prescription. The publications that attempt to consider how human 
motivations ought to inform policy design tend to focus on the dichotomy between selfish egoism 
and pure altruism, but as the social policy analyst, Robert Pinker (2006, p.19), states, “a model of 
human motivation based on a sharply drawn distinction between the qualities of egoism and 
altruism [bears] little or no relationship to what we know about human nature and the realities of the 
world in which we live.” The work that focusses on the potential import of reputational effects and 
rewarding and punishing good and bad relative performance perhaps comes closest to being 
reciprocity-driven, without acknowledging it as such. People do of course have other motivations, 
but the literature reviewed earlier suggests that the tendency towards reciprocity is crucial to human 
cooperation. It appears that nourishing reciprocity, and cautiousness against undermining it, ought 
to be an important consideration in public policy, a view shared by Pinker (2006), although his 
consequent recommendation for a pluralist mixed economy of welfare with a diversity of service 
providers so as to reduce the risk of dependency for users, diverges from the conclusions reached in 
this article. The rest of this paper will focus upon suggesting some ways in which reciprocity might 
inform macro and micro public sector policy design. The discussion is merely indicative, and is in 
no way intended to be an exhaustive list of the ways in which reciprocity might inform policy, but 
is rather meant to serve as food for thought on the import of this apparently core motivational 
feature in the design of any cooperative endeavour.  
 
 
Reciprocity and public policy design 
 
In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson (1965) argued that large groups will not be able to 
organise themselves voluntarily for coordinated and cooperative action, even if they have good 
reason for doing so. This is sometimes because the more people who have to share a collective 
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benefit, the less that each individual can singularly gain, making the return on their cooperation less 
meaningful to them, and also because large groups may have substantial organisation costs, which 
have to be subtracted from the expect benefits. Most importantly, however, Olson took the view that 
any rational self-interested person would choose to free ride on large group endeavours, and thus 
assuming that such behaviour is endemic, there would be insufficient effort within the group to 
produce the collective good. Smaller groups, on the other hand, are better able to sustain 
cooperation, according to Olson, because if a person tries to free ride in a small group, it is more 
noticeable, and it is thus easier to identify and punish the culprit. Olson concluded that the voluntary 
rational pursuit of individual self-interest is more likely to bring about, if by no means guarantee, 
group oriented behaviour in relatively small groups. 
 
Although not accepting Olson’s assumption that selfish egoism necessarily drives human action, 
those who hold the view that many people are natural reciprocators nevertheless recognise that 
selfishness among a few can destroy group cooperation. It is perhaps therefore the case that 
reciprocity has the best chance of being sustained if a group is not too large and its’ membership not 
too fluid. It is, as Olson wrote, easier for a smaller group than for a larger group to be transparent 
and to hold its members to account; there is even some controlled experimental evidence that 
suggests that the impact of strong reciprocity on cooperation is better manifested when groups are 
coherent and permanent (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) and where mutual commitments are exchanged 
(Ostrom, 1998), and it is plausible that coherence and the opportunity to engage in personal 
exchange are inversely correlated with group size. Relatively small groups may be better able to 
develop innovative cooperative strategies to enhance their efficiency (and may be further motivated 
to do so if there is inter-group reputational competition). If the collective of groups is organised 
appropriately such that cross-group learning is encouraged, then this may be optimal for a policy 
sector as a whole. As Sethi and Somanathan (2005, p.242-243) have noted, members “of groups 
that exhibit efficient norms will enjoy higher material payoffs than members of groups that do not, 
and such norms may therefore spread through the population by the imitation of successful practices 
found in neighbouring groups”…“norms of reciprocity are an important component of social 
capital.”  
 
The lesson from all this for public policy is that it may serve everyone well if the organisation, 
management and – to foster responsibility, assuming adequate risk adjustment across groups – 
financing of services were decentralised, but to have a national (or super-regional) policy to 
encourage experimentation within and learning across local areas, subject to a nationally-imposed 
minimum standard of service provision. In some countries, the national level organisation of certain 
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services, such as health care, is almost sacred to many, and it is likely that such an institutional 
structure is the most appropriate if one’s goal is to secure national standards of equity and quality at 
any particular moment in time, but over time most people, including relatively deprived 
populations, might experience greater welfare improvements if local experimentation and 
cooperation, and cross-regional learning, were allowed and encouraged. If the great scholars of 
human motivation are right, there is a strong intellectual, and even evolutionary, justification to 
argue that public sector quality and efficiency would be better secured if any faith in the national 
state as the sole organising and financing body was weakened.  
 
As well as offering broad guidance on the appropriate size of governance units, the literature on 
reciprocity can inform performance improving policy interventions. As noted above, many 
commentators and policy makers have emphasised the market mechanism as a means to motivate 
public sector employees over the past two decades. There are those who believe that sincere caring 
for others is eroded by the market, a view challenged by others. Bruni and Sugden (2008, p.63) 
write, for example, that “the family is not a domain separate from the market, governed by a 
different set of motivations. The family and the market are both parts of civil society, subject to the 
same fundamental standards of reciprocity, trust and mutual respect. When these standards are 
upheld, whether outside the market or within it, genuine caring is possible.” Nonetheless, it is 
plausible that the complex nature of public sector services might give those who are selfishly 
motivated much scope to act in socially undesirable ways without fear of punishment, and that these 
tendencies would be encouraged by a mechanism – i.e. a competitive market – that could erode 
empathy, trust and reciprocity with and towards others because of the focus placed upon beating 
one’s rivals. In short, competition in many of its forms rewards selfish tendencies, which, at least 
according to the theory of public service motivation and its postulate that public sector employees 
are intrinsically motivated to do good (Perry and Wise, 1990), seems at odds with an appropriate 
public sector ethos. Within a group with a shared goal, the more appropriate strategy might be to 
nurture the basic motivations that feed cooperation (i.e. positive and negative reciprocity), if it is 
assumed, as seems reasonable, that cooperation is the best way to achieve the goal.  
 
Although Genovesi’s (1765-67) belief in fraternity in market relations may withstand trade over 
relatively simple goods, selfish egoism might therefore be expected to flourish, and flourish with 
detrimental consequences, over more complex goods unless the competitive market is tightly 
regulated. However, might reciprocity be reinforced in non-competitive trade, of which pay for 
performance, internationally an increasingly prevalent public policy tool over the last fifteen years, 
is an example? On this there has been some debate. With a straightforward payment mechanism – 
19 
 
i.e. a simple reciprocal exchange whereby one party pays to receive a good or service from another 
party without either party seeking to receive payment or goods from elsewhere but with both parties 
perhaps keen to trade with each other again in the future (as arguably is the case between Adam 
Smith’s butcher, baker and brewer in The Wealth of Nations) – providers’ fear that a service rival 
will unfairly undermine them, and the temptation for them to unfairly undermine a rival, is largely 
removed. Nonetheless, particularly in relation to complex goods and with substantial information 
asymmetries, there remains the risk of some payers trying to get more than what they have paid for 
and for some providers to give less than what is fair. The latter possibility may be exacerbated if 
pay for performance methods are imposed on public sector providers, in part because they may be 
seen as controlling rather than supportive, which might undermine morale and the professionals’ 
identity with the sector in which they work (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Deci and Ryan, 1985), 
but also if they are perceived as offering unfair remuneration. If the remuneration is too generous, 
then this is clearly problematic for those who ultimately pay for public sector services (e.g. tax 
payers). Also, if the quality indicators are ill thought out, then the mechanism may distort priorities. 
If pay for performance is to have a chance of working as intended, then it would appear that all 
stakeholders have to be involved in determining fair prices and indicators of quality that are broadly 
perceived as appropriate. These arguments may bring to mind Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory of 
motivation, in which payers might be said to relate rewards directly to performance and will ensure 
that the rewards are deserved and wanted by the recipients. Of course, information asymmetries are 
still likely to be potentially problematic given the complexity of the goods and services under 
consideration and the propensity for at least some parties to cheat if they think that such activities 
might go undetected. Thus, any trust that is successfully forged between the relevant parties 
probably has to be supplemented with input from a knowledgeable arbitrator that all parties accept, 
who would need to monitor the exchange relationship and the forthcoming provider outcomes. 
Olson (1965) refers to such an arbitrator as an entrepreneur, who can forge agreements within 
groups for the good of all concerned. Creating these conditions for reciprocity may optimise the 
chance that the policy will benefit those it is meant to serve.          
 
Even if the above conditions are met, however, many remain sceptical of the promised benefits of 
pay for performance mechanisms. For instance, Kahan (2005) has argued that performance 
incentives may undermine cooperative tendencies by introducing the expectation that one must get 
paid for everything that one does, and thus might consequently erode any motivation to undertake 
voluntary beneficial actions. If many professionals are relying on each other to deliver a defined 
outcome (in health care or education, for example), the near certainty that the performance 
mechanism will not encapsulate every process that is important to the successful delivery of that 
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outcome renders it plausible that the overall objective will indeed be undermined by the 
introduction of pay for performance mechanisms. Perhaps informed by the natural inclination 
towards negative reciprocity, Kahan intimates that credible penalties are likely to be more beneficial 
than performance-linked rewards, because people who resent fraud, corruption or cheating, for 
example, might see penalties against such activities as supportive of their own belief system, which 
may strengthen their identity with the organisation in which they operate and detract from the 
temptation to commit an injustice. Ostrom (1990) noted that monitoring and graduated sanctions are 
typical in common-pool resource institutions.    
 
Ostrom (2005) wrote that many policies that have been developed in modern democracies crowd 
out trust, reciprocity, cooperation, knowledge of local circumstances and experimentation, and the 
possibility of an insufficiently thought through performance incentive mechanism crowding out 
those who are intrinsically motivated to provide public sector services (cf. the theory of public 
service motivation, mentioned earlier), and crowding in those who are not intrinsically motivated, 
cannot be discounted. This being said (and even putting to one side any concern that some might 
use the evidence of motivational crowding as a justification for offering low public sector wages), 
the evidence presented earlier suggests that generosity, at least in terms of basic wage payment, is 
rewarded with higher employee effort, and thus work that is intrinsically rewarding calls for a 
delicately balanced remuneration strategy. Informed by the literature on reciprocity, it appears 
reasonable to conclude that the use of performance incentives at the decentralised local level might 
be a positive force in improving welfare if certain conditions are met; namely, that salaries are the 
predominant component of remuneration, that all relevant parties recognise and accept that the 
chosen indicators of good performance in any pay for performance mechanism are appropriate in 
moving towards an overall objective (e.g. good health or education outcomes), and that all parties 
accept the compensation offered for meeting performance targets as fair. Moreover, negative 
performance incentives, which can be reputational or financial, such as naming and shaming 
strategies and credible financial penalties, are cautiously recommended for performance that is 
widely recognised as absolutely unacceptable. A good example of a strategy that was not quite as 
pejorative as the English NHS star rating system but yet also posed the threat of reputational 
damage can be found in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the health care system that 
covers honourably discharged veterans of the US armed forces. In the mid-1990s, the VHA 
introduced a system whereby the performance of its hospitals, in terms of quality indicators such as 
some cancer screening rates, patient cholesterol levels and the like, was disseminated annually in 
the form of a league table. The VHA was traditionally widely associated with poor quality care, but 
within five years of introducing this reputational mechanism, the system demonstrated substantial 
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improvements in quality. By 2005, it was outperforming all of the other sectors of US health care 
on almost all of the quality criteria over which a comparison was possible (Oliver, 2007). 
Instruments of negative reciprocity, of which the VHA’s hospital league table is perhaps one 
example, can guard against the temptation for people to act in an egoistically self-interested manner 
which, if prevalent, would otherwise undermine, with detrimental consequences, cohesion and 
cooperation in most groups. 
 
Reciprocity might therefore be used to inform the most appropriate system-wide incentive 
mechanism if cooperation is deemed desirable, but the tendency towards reciprocating behaviours 
may also be of use when considering the design of much more targeted policy interventions. Much 
policy focuses upon attempts to motivate behaviour change among citizens, or public sector users, 
on the demand-side rather than the behaviour of public sector professionals on the supply side; 
indeed, attempting to motivate behaviour change among the citizenry has been a preoccupation 
within the burgeoning behavioural science-informed policy movement over the last several years. 
The Behavioural Insights Team in the United Kingdom, which was established by David Cameron 
in order for it to develop public policy proposals that are informed by behavioural science, has 
experimented with the differential framing of messages according to a number of human 
motivations (self-interest, altruism etc.), to encourage people to register as organ donors. That 
which appeared to emphasise reciprocity, by stating that increasing the number of those on the 
register would potentially benefit everyone, including those who registered, was the most effective 
message (Behavioural Insights Team, 2013). 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
Arguments and evidence from a range of disciplinary perspectives suggest that reciprocity is a basic 
human motivation that underlies cooperation within groups. The origins of reciprocity are debated, 
but it is plausible that the capacity for deliberative reciprocity in humans developed from the 
attitudinal reciprocity that is common in the animal kingdom, and that cooperative tendencies 
offered evolutionary advantages to groups where a reflective form of reciprocity was, and is, 
prevalent among its members. In short, this argument, as intimated by Darwin, states that 
reciprocity developed naturally because it is good for human societies and that the golden rule was 
ultimately embraced as a normative postulate in most of the world’s major religions because this 
descriptive fact was known implicitly.  
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Few would deny that other motivations are also common. However, these motivations are 
individualistic in nature – we take from or give to others. Reciprocity is the only motivation that 
recognises that we are social creatures – we take from and give to each other, and of all the 
motivations is key to solving problems that require collective action (Ostrom, 1998). Moreover, in 
the negative sense, reciprocity guards against the selfish and protects those who are unusually 
inclined towards altruism. The embrace of the competitive market in social policy in many 
countries over the past twenty-five years on the assumption that people are egoists appears to have 
been a reductionist move that would have been rejected by many of the great figures in intellectual 
thought, across disciplines, including economics. Many of the goods and services delivered by 
public sectors are too complex to expect competitive markets to deliver them efficiently or justly. 
Planned public sector services often arose, after all, because the competitive market was not an 
efficient or just means by which to deliver these services, and the planning and organisation of 
those services must encourage, rather than undermine, the obligations that the relevant members of 
any group ought to feel – and naturally, for the most part, do feel – towards each other.  
 
This is not to conclude that all competition is inconsistent with reciprocity. Reputational 
competition via the public reporting of quality performance, if administered carefully so as to avoid 
demotivating poor relative performers, is, for instance, consistent with the notion that people will 
want to signal that they are good co-operators/reciprocators. Fostering a good reputation and 
avoiding a bad one is central to cooperation within groups, but it would be wise only to use the 
motivating force of negative reciprocity if performance is bad in an absolute sense because 
unwarranted fear may undermine identity with the group. Reputational competition does not, 
however, necessitate any demand side choice. Allowing public sector organisations to compete for 
clientele renders it more likely that egoistic self-interest will crowd out a desire to reciprocate, 
particularly in areas where informational asymmetries are rife.  
 
In this article, the overall conclusion is that public services might in large part best be managed at a 
decentralised level rather than by the central state, and that provisions should be put in place for 
region-specific experimentation and cross-regional learning. Moreover, a cautious implementation 
of performance management may be defensible, but the use of demand-led competitive measures is 
not. There is nothing startlingly new or expansive in these policy suggestions, but the argument that 
reciprocity leads us to them is innovative and important. Reciprocity ought to feature in all 
deliberations on policy design where group cooperation is an essential prerequisite for the policy’s 
success because although most of us are to varying degrees sometimes knights and occasionally 
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knaves, the success of the groups in which we socialise and work is consequent upon a heavy dose 
of reciprocation. The golden rule is everywhere, and it is golden for a reason.  
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